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Some  Tests of the Economic  Theory of
Cooperatives:  Methodology  and
Application to Cotton Ginning
Richard J. Sexton,  Brooks  M. Wilson,  and Joyce  J. Wann
Little progress  has been made in testing the often conflicting  hypotheses generated
from theoretical research  on cooperatives.  This paper addresses the deficiency  by
describing  and applying (to  California cotton ginning cooperatives)  a methodology to
test key hypotheses concerning  (a) cooperatives'  price-output equilibrium,  (b)
allocative  efficiency,  and (c)  utilization of capital  inputs. The empirical results  (a) are
consistent with predictions  from the game  theory model of cooperative  behavior,  (b)
reject the null hypothesis of absolute allocative  efficiency,  and (c) indicate absolute
overutilization  of capital inputs among the sample  cooperatives.
Key words: cooperatives,  cotton ginning, economic efficiency,  profit function.
In  recent  decades,  considerable  progress  has
been made in developing and refining econom-
ic theories of the behavior  of cooperative  en-
terprises.  Key  contributions  have  included
identifying  the  restricted-membership  opti-
mum (Clark), the open-membership,  welfare-
maximizing  solution  (Ohm),  and  the  open-
membership,  Ramsey  second-best  optimum
(Helmberger and  Hoos).  Further  refinements
of the theory have been accomplished recently
through  use of game  theory  methods  (Staatz
1984; Sexton  1986). Reviews of this literature
are provided by LeVay (1983a), Sexton (1984),
and Staatz (1987).
Scholars  in  the  field  agree  that  a  pressing
research  need  is  to  develop  and  implement
empirical tests of the often conflicting theories
(LeVay  1983a,  p. 39; Staatz  1987,  p. 91). We
address this problem in the present paper by
describing  and applying  a general methodol-
ogy  to test  key  hypotheses  concerning  coop-
eratives'  price-output  equilibrium,  allocative
(price) efficiency, and use of  capital inputs. Our
approach consists of (a) deriving the restricted
profit function for a marketing cooperative, (b)
augmenting  the profit function  with parame-
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ters to test for allocative  efficiency,  (c)  statis-
tically estimating the  augmented profit  func-
tion, and  (d) conducting  the tests mentioned
above. The methodology is adapted from work
in the public  utilities'  literature  by Atkinson
and Halvorsen  (1980,  1984) and from earlier
work by Lau and Yotopoulos.
We  specify a cooperative's  objective  func-
tion as  follows:
(1)  max  7r*  =  Pf(X, R) - WX,
{x}
where R is the volume  of raw product  deliv-
ered  by the members  and taken  as given by
the  co-op,  X =  {X,,  ... ,  Xn}  is  a vector  of
inputs used in processing,  W= { W,...,  Wn}
is  the vector  of parametric  input prices,  P is
the parametric price for the processed product,
Y,  produced according to the functionJ(X, R).
The first-order conditions to (1),
(2) PDf(X, R)= W,
where  D is  the vector  partial derivative  op-
erator, can be used to derive a restricted  profit
function  that is conditional  upon the level of
R:
(3) r* = 7r*(P,  W,  R),
where -r* specifies the maximum net revenue
obtainable  from each  (P,  W, R) combination.
For given  P and  W,  7r*(R)/R  is  the familiar
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net-average-revenue-product  (NARP)  func-
tion introduced by Helmberger  (1964):
'(4) NARP(R)  = -r*(R)/R.
Our first hypothesis test examines the debate
among co-op theorists concerning the location
along the NARP curve of a cooperative's  equi-
librium output.
As the next section describes  in detail,  con-
cern has been expressed that cooperatives will
be run inefficiently. To rigorously examine hy-
potheses  concerning  cooperatives'  efficiency,
we introduce a vector of parameters, k = {k1,
... , knJ,  to allow  a cooperative  to systemati-
cally  deviate  from  the usual  first-order  con-
ditions for the optimization problem in (1):
(5)  Paf/8X, = k,Wi, k, >  0,  i  = 1, ... ,  n.
Statistical  tests for absolute  allocative  effi-
ciency  concern the joint hypothesis that ki  =
kj =  1 for all variable  inputs i, j.
For empirical purposes, lr* is specified in the
translog form. Our application is to cotton gin-
ning  cooperatives  in  California.  The  results
show the cooperatives overused inputs relative
to the amount of cotton ginned. Moreover, the
gins' location  along the NARP curve tends to
support predictions based on the game theory
approach to cooperation.
In the paper's next section we establish the
basis  for our  tests  of co-op  theory  and  then
provide details on the methodology to conduct
the tests. The application to the California cot-
ton ginning industry is then described, empir-
ical results are presented, and the tests of the-
ory are conducted and discussed.
Aspects  of Cooperative  Theory
Price and Output Equilibria
The NARP function in (4) specifies the maxi-
mum break-even  price  the co-op can pay  for
a given amount of the raw product R and  is
fundamental  to all of the traditional  theories
of co-op marketing behavior. In particular, all
embrace  the fundamental  optimization  con-
dition with respect to X in (2), upon which the
restricted  profit  function  in  (3)  and,  in  turn,
the NARP function in (4) are based. Disagree-
ment has  concerned  the  location  of the  co-
operative's equilibrium output along the NARP
curve.
The  objective  function  in (1) conforms di-
rectly to the well-known Helmberger and Hoos
theory. The co-op is assumed to treat member
deliveries as a parameter,  choosing instead to
specify  price  via  the  NARP  function.  The
Helmberger-Hoos  equilibrium  occurs  where
NARP  intersects  members'  inverse  supply
curve,  S(R), S'(R) > 0.  This solution is a sin-
gle-product  Ramsey  second-best optimum  in
that it  satisfies  the  co-op's  break-even  con-
straint by setting price for the raw product ac-
cording to its average-revenue  product rather
than its marginal-revenue  product.
An alternative solution first offered by Ohm
and  later championed  by  LeVay  (1983b)  re-
quires the co-op also to optimize with respect
to  R  by  setting  price  for  the  raw  product
equal  to  its  net-marginal-revenue  product,
NMRP(R), where, from (3), NMRP(R) = dr*/
dR:
(6) NMRP(R) = dr*/aR = r = S(R).
This solution  is the  "first-best"  optimum  in
that it maximizes member welfare for a given
S(R), but the fact that NARP # NMRP, except
at the former's maximum, means that the co-
operative's break-even  requirement (paying a
price  equal  to NARP) usually cannot be  met
by a simple linear price. Thus, the intersection
of NMRP(R)  and  S(R)  is  not ordinarily  an
equilibrium,  and  proponents  of the solution
must turn to multipart pricing schemes or sup-
ply quotas to preserve  the optimum.
A third alternative solution,  suggested orig-
inally by Clark, requires optimization with re-
spect to the membership  size prior to under-
taking the production problem  in (1).  In this
manner, supply is constrained to intersect the
maximum  NARP,  giving members  the maxi-
mum raw product price possible.'
The  game  theory  approach  to cooperation
(Staatz  1984, Ch.  5; Sexton  1986)  poses chal-
lenges to each of the traditional theories.  The
appealing game theory solution concept for the
cooperation game is the core or an appropriate
extension of the core to accommodate  multi-
cooperative environments (Sexton 1986). Core-
mandated optimization  compels pricing  of R
according to its NMRP schedule as called for
by Ohm-LeVay but in contrast to Helmberger-
Hoos. However, the game theory approach re-
jects  the traditional  Ohm-LeVay  solution
' This triumvirate of alternative solutions are easily set forth in
a single diagram  featuring NARP(R), NMRP(R), and S(R). LeVay
(1983a, p.  11;  1983b, p.  106)  provides illustrations.
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where  S(R)  intersects  NMRP(R) to the right
of the maximum  NARP.  These  solutions  are
shown  to  be  almost  certainly  unstable  and
unenforceable  because  a  subcoalition  of the
members can break  away from the  larger co-
op and raise  its payoff by forming a smaller,
more efficient co-op located nearer to the max-
imum NARP (Sexton  1986, p. 220).
Counterexamples  to  Clark's  maximum
NARP solution also emerge from the game the-
ory  models  because  single-  and  multiple-co-
operative  core allocations can be found where
the association(s) produces at rates beyond the
maximum  NARP.  These  solutions,  though,
tend to vanish as the optimum number of co-
operatives becomes  large,  and  the core  or its
multico-op  analogue  converges  to  solutions
wherein each co-op  operates at the maximum
NARP.
It is useful to compare the alternative results
for the cooperative  to the equilibrium  for an
equivalent  competitive  firm  whose  objective
is to maximize  profit with respect  to choices
of X and R, treating  all prices  as given.  That
is, the competitive  firm faces the unrestricted
profit  function,  Xr**(P,  W,  r). Using  existing
notation,  the competitive  firm's problem  can
be decomposed  into the optimal choice  of X
given R and  the optimal  choice of R.  These
optimal  choices  are  given respectively  by (2)
and  (6).  Thus,  the competitive  firm  achieves
the same optimization conditions as the Ohm-
LeVay  cooperative,  although  the latter  faces
the nonconstant supply price,  r = S(R).
An additional equilibrium  constraint facing
the competitive firm is zero profits, i.e.,  ir*(P,
W, R)  - rR = 0.  Rearranging this expression
and using (6)  obtains:
(7)
NARP(R)  = ir*(R)/R = r = ar*/OR = NMRP(R).
The market  forces  of entry  and  exit  drive
the competitive market price to the maximum
of NARP(R), and the competitive firm attains
a result identical to the technologically  equiv-
alent  Clark-type  Co-op  and also  identical  to
the game  theory  equilibrium  when  the  opti-
mum number of cooperatives  in a market be-
comes  large.
In sum, the game theory model predicts that
cooperatives  in a  multico-op  market  will  all
operate very near to the maximum NARP. That
is,  we  should  not observe  cooperatives  in  a
multico-op  market  operating  significantly  to
either the left or right of the maximum  NARP
as is most often the case in typical renderings
of the  Helmberger-Hoos  or  Ohm-LeVay  so-
lutions. Given the possibility of "flat-topped"
NARP curves, this conclusion does not imply
that the co-ops must be a similar  size.
Rearranging  the equality  in  (7),  we  obtain
the testable  game  theory  hypothesis that  the
elasticity of  7r* with respect to R is unitary over
the range of output observed:
(8) Ho: (&7r*/OR)(R/lr*)=  1.
Allocative Efficiency of Cooperatives
Allocative  or price efficiency  measures the ex-
tent to which enterprises succeed in optimizing
with respect to the input and output prices they
face.  Concern  often  has  been  expressed  that
cooperatives will be run inefficiently. One ba-
sis for this hypothesis is that farmers often lack
business acumen compared to the directors of
nonco-op  enterprises  (Helmberger  1966).
Another  concern  is  the lack  of an  incentive
structure  in cooperatives  to induce  manage-
ment to run the association efficiently  (Staatz
1984,  Ch.  2;  Caves  and  Peterson).  Whereas
management  stock options,  threats of hostile
takeover,  and  the stock price's  behavior as  a
barometer of managerial  performance  all act
to mitigate concerns about managerial shirking
in nonco-ops,  none of these  mechanisms  are
present in cooperatives. 2
Two studies to date have attempted to ana-
lyze aspects  of the efficiency  of cooperatives
(Babb and Boynton; Porter and Scully).  Both
studies focused on the dairy processing indus-
try  but  used  disparate  methodologies  and
reached  opposing conclusions,  indicating the
need  for improved  methodologies  and  more
empirical  studies on this topic.
With  reference  to  equation  (5),  concerns
about absolute co-op allocative efficiency may
be  statistically  tested via the hypothesis  that
the ki are all unitary:
(9)  H1: k, = k2  =  = kn  =  1.
Rejection  of H1 implies that the cooperative
has not been  price  efficient.  Tests  of overall
relative  price efficiency:
2 Co-op  stock  is  usually  nontransferable  and,  hence,  has  no
meaningful market price. Thus, stock option plans are not a viable
management incentive,  and there  is no stock  price  barometer by
which to monitor management's behavior (Fama).  Finally, since
stock  cannot be easily acquired, takeovers of the usual corporate
mode are not possible  in cooperatives.
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Hla: kl  =  k2 =  ..  = k,,
or pairwise relative price efficiency:
Hlb: k,= k,  i  j,
may be used to indicate the nature of the inef-
ficiency.
One interpretation of the rejection of H1 (At-
kinson and Halvorsen  1984)  is that decisions
have not been based on  W but, rather,  on the
"shadow"  price  vector,  kW  =  {kW,,  ... ,
knWn}.  For example,  in discussions  of mana-
gerial  shirking,  a  motivation  commonly  at-
tributed to managers is to surround themselves
with  larger  staffs  than would  be  dictated  by
efficiency criteria,  i.e., equation (2).  Implicitly
or explicitly  these  managers  behave  as if la-
bor's wage is not  WL but,  rather,  the shadow
wage,  kLWL,  where in this case  kL  <  1. Esti-
mation of the  ki, thus,  provides a way  to un-
cover decision  makers' shadow prices.
Cooperatives and Capital  Inputs
One particularly  interesting  subset  of the rel-
ative  efficiency  tests,  Hlb,  concerns  the  dis-
agreement as to whether cooperatives will tend
to over- or underutilize capital inputs. Reasons
cited for possible underutilization are fourfold
(Vitaliano;  Staatz  1984,  Ch.  2;  Murray):  (a)
Patronage,  not capital, is the residual claimant
in co-ops. As such, co-ops either pay no capital
dividend or pay only a limited, fixed amount,
making co-op investments unattractive to out-
side investors; (b) Co-op investments are usu-
ally nonmarketable and, hence, are highly non-
liquid; (c)  Co-op investments constitute a claim
on  the  future  earnings  of the  co-op  only  in
conjunction with continued patronage. No av-
enue exists,  therefore,  to internalize  the reve-
nue-producing potential of a co-op investment
beyond  the  member's  lifetime-the  so-called
"horizon problem";  and (d) Co-op  members
intrinsically  prefer to allocate  capital  invest-
ments to their farms than to the cooperative.
These  factors  suggest  that co-op  members
individually  have  no incentive  to  contribute
equity  beyond  whatever  contractually  is  re-
quired  to  secure  patronage  privileges  and  to
free  ride if possible  on  other members'  con-
tributions.  Although  cooperatives  may  at-
tempt  to  counteract  undercapitalization
through increased use of long-term debt, their
ability  to do  so  is  limited  by creditors'  un-
willingness  to lend to poorly  capitalized ven-
tures. Ultimately, the hypothesized deficiency
of funds  for long-term  investments  must be-
come  reflected  in  underutilization  of capital
inputs.
A counterargument to this reasoning (Caves
and Peterson) is that co-op members gain util-
ity from an impressive plant and capital equip-
ment and  may approve  excessive  capital  in-
vestment policies when (a) the utility gain from
impressive  co-op plant  and equipment is un-
correlated with  a member's  patronage, (b) the
size  distribution  of members'  patronage  re-
flects  a large  number of small-volume  mem-
bers  and  a  relatively  few  large-volume
members,  (c) investment contributions are pro-
portional  to  patronage,  and  (d)  investment
decisions are based on one-member-one-vote
democracy.  These  factors jointly give  small-
volume members the desire and ability to en-
force overinvestment  policies  on the co-op  at
the  expense  of  large-volume  producers.
Another argument (Murray) is that co-op man-
agers will favor overinvestment  strategies and
such strategies may be implemented in the ab-
sence of strong control by the membership.
Conditional upon rejection of  H1 in (9), spe-
cific hypotheses  relevant  to  testing  concerns
about capital  allocation  are the absolute  effi-
ciency test:
H2:  kK= 1,
and/or the relative  efficiency  tests:
H3: k  = kj,
where K denotes capital andj denotes any oth-
er variable  input.
Methodology
Although  the  methodology  to  conduct  these
tests of co-op theory has general applicability,
we  develop  it in  the context  of our  specific
application  to  cooperative  cotton  gins.  The
ginning process  produces  baled lint  and  cot-
tonseed in essentially fixed proportions so that
we may consider a single composite output, Y,
with the parametric  output  price,  P, being  a
weighted  average of the prices for cottonseed
and baled lint. Variable inputs into the ginning
process are labor (L), energy  (E),  and capital
(K), with parametric input prices  WL,  WE, and
WK,  respectively.  Capital  is treated as  a vari-
able  input  because  the  gins'  long periods  of
shut-down  time,  usually  about  nine  months
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each  year,  make it easy to undertake  year-to-
year adjustments in buildings and equipment.
Our data indicate that such adjustments were
made often.
The ginning  cooperatives  process whatever
amounts of raw cotton, R, their members de-
liver. Thus, the gins treat R as a parameter and
face  the optimization problem in (1).
Treating P as the numeraire and using it to
normalize  the  input  prices  (i.e.,  WL  =  WL/P,
WE  =  WE/P,  and  WK  =  WK/P) does not  affect
the solution to (1). The normalized profit func-
tion, ir,  is, thus, expressed in terms of the nor-
malized input prices,  w, and R:
(3') 7r  =  ir(w, R).
The decision rule supplied in (5) enables the
co-op to diverge behaviorally  from price effi-
cient  behavior  and  to  base  decisions  on  the
shadow prices, kW. In terms of the normalized
prices,  w, we  have  the  following  behavioral
decision rule:
(10)  dY/dXj  = kjwj,  L,E, K.
Therefore,  the  behavioral  normalized  profit
function  (Lau and Yotopoulos;  Atkinson  and
Halvorsen) is
(11) rb =  rb(kW,  R).
The actual input-demand and output-supply
functions  can be  obtained  from  (11)  via the
Shepard-Uzawa-McFadden  Lemma (Varian):
(12)  X, = -d  b(kw,  R)/d(kw,)
=  -(1/kj)(  rb(kw,  R)/dw,),
j  = L, E, K.
(13)  Y =  rb  - wj  ,Xb(kw, R)/dw,.
J
The actual normalized profit function, 7ra,  is
obtained  by substituting  the actual input-de-
mand and output-supply functions in (12) and
(13)  into the normalized  profit equation:  7r,  =
j
(14)  Ia=  ib+  .(  ')  Wk,  R)
For estimation  purposes,  Irb is specified  via
the popular translog form:3
3 The  translog is  among the  class of locally  flexible  functional
forms.  These functions are capable  of providing arbitrary  values
for  elasticities  at  a  particular  data  point.  Among  the  functions
satisfying this flexibility property,  the translog has been found  to
perform well in Monte Carlo studies (Guilkey, Lovell, and Sickles).
Although "globally"  flexible functional  forms have  recently  been
introduced, little  application, particularly  in respect to estimation
of  production technologies, has been accomplished with these func-
tions.
(15)  In  7rb = a,  + C  aln(kjwj)
1
+ - ,ln(kwi)ln(kjw)
+  6Rln R + - RR(ln R) 2
+  O  Rln(kjwj)ln R,
j
i, j  L,E,K,
where symmetry of cross-price effects requires
that  y  =-  -ji.
Taking  antilogs  of (15)  and  differentiating
with respect  to the  wj obtains
(16)  arb/lwj = (rwb/W)[aO  +  jln(k,w,)
+  Rn  R],  j=L,  E, K.
Using (16) to substitute into (14) for dro,/aw
and  using the antilog of (15)  to substitute  for
7rb  in (14) yields
(17)  in  ra  =In{1  +  C  [(1  - k)/k,]
.[  -+  A  yln(kwi)
+ fRln Rt1
+ a,  +  2  ajln(kjw
+  jln(kiw,)ln(kjwj) 2
j
+  6Rin R  + 2f  RR(ln R)
2
+  Z  3Rjln(kjw,)ln(R),
i, j=L,E,K.
If ki = kj = 1 for all  i, j,  (17),  the actual nor-
malized profit function,  simplifies to (15),  the
behavioral  normalized  profit function.
Using the results  in (12)  and  denoting  the
curly-bracketed  term  in (17)  as  q, the  input
share equations  based on (17)  are
(18)  Sj - wXj/ra
=  -din 7ra/dln wj
=  - -l~-I
oj +  yijln k +  yin w
+  /Rjln  R]
i,j= L,E, K.
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The basic  equation  system consists of (17)
and the three share  equations in (18). A  clas-
sical disturbance term is also appended to each
equation  in (17)  and (18)  to reflect nonsyste-
matic errors in optimization as opposed to sys-
tematic deviations from the optimization con-
ditions in (2) which are captured by the ki. The
equations are nonlinear in parameters and are
estimated  using  full  information  maximum
likelihood (FIML). 4'5
Application  to the California Cotton
Ginning Industry
California  is  the  second-largest  producer  of
cotton  in  the  United  States,  accounting  for
about 25% of the U.S. production.  The major
producing  region  is  the  San  Joaquin  Valley
(SJV).  During our study period,  the  1980-81
to  1984-85  ginning  seasons,  California  had
about 3,000 cotton producing farms. Most of
the farms were  sole proprietorships  or closed
corporations with an average  size of 270 acres
compared  to a national average of 110.
The  ginning  process  separates  the  cotton-
seed from  the lint.  A typical  ginning  facility
includes  a storage yard,  a business  office, and
the gin structure, consisting of a concrete slab,
gin equipment, and a building. The equipment
transports the raw cotton by air flow through
the gin, dries it using natural gas  or propane,
removes  stems,  leaves,  dirt,  and  other trash,
separates  the lint from the cottonseed, further
cleans  the  lint,  and  compresses  it into  500-
pound  bales.  Gin  plant  capacities  currently
range from  10 to 40 bales per hour.
The SJV  cotton  is ginned  through  any  one
of about  35 cooperatives,  two  privately held
corporations which operate multiple facilities,
or several  grower-owned,  nonco-op  facilities.
The  co-op  normally  is given title  to the  cot-
tonseed  as  payment  for  the ginning  service.
Seed  revenues  always  exceeded  ginning  costs
in  our  sample,  with the  surplus  receipts  re-
turned to growers in accord with standard co-
op practice. The grower retains title to the lint.
4  Nonzero covariances  between cross-equation  disturbances for
each observation  are  to be expected. An iterative Zellner-efficient
(seemingly unrelated  regression) estimation methodology  is, thus,
appropriate.  In this case, maximum likelihood estimation is equiv-
alent  to Zellner-efficient  estimation  (Oberhofer and Kmenta).
5 Our estimation methodology  assumes that the k, are constant
parameters  across  observations.  Given  our short time series  and
homogeneous cross section of  gins, this standard assumption seems
reasonable.  If necessary,  the  k, could  be allowed to differ  across
observations using dummy variables  or a random coefficients  ap-
proach.
None of our tests are dependent upon the spe-
cifics of the cooperatives' methods of payment
to growers.  Rather,  tests are based on the co-
operatives' level of raw product input (Ho) and
the  use  of capital,  labor,  and  energy  inputs
relative to their market prices and the market
prices for the baled cotton and cottonseed (H1,
Hla, Hb,,  H2, and H3).
Variable Measurement and Data Sources
Twenty-two  SJV  ginning  cooperatives  con-
tributed  financial and operations  data for the
1980-81  to  1984-85  ginning seasons.  Labor
expenditures  for  each  gin  were  measured  as
the sum  of its  annual  direct and  indirect ex-
penditures (e.g.,  payroll taxes and fringe ben-
efits) for full- and part-time employes. The wage
rate,  W,  for each gin was computed by divid-
ing its labor expenditures by the annual hours
worked  (including overtime)  by the gin's full-
and part-time employes.
Energy  expenditures  for  each  gin were  the
sum of its annual expenditures for electricity,
natural gas, and/or propane.  BTU prices were
computed from the gin's utility rate schedules
and aggregated  into  a single  BTU price,  WE,
for each  gin using  BTU  quantity  weights for
each energy  source.6
Ginning  equipment  (G)  and  buildings  (B)
comprised  the  capital  stock.  Each  was  mea-
sured  using the perpetual inventory method:
Kit =I,  + (1 - O  -i)Kit_-,  i = G, B,
where Ki, is the real end-of-year stock,  Iit is the
quantity of real  investment  during  the year,
and 0, is the rate of replacement.  The Kit and
Ii,  were  obtained  from  each  gin's  financial
statements, and based on industry opinion, we
used  0i  =  l/Ti, where  T, is the asset's  service
life  set  at  15  (25)  years'  life  for  equipment
(buildings). None of  the paper's results are sen-
sitive to the  choice of depreciation  rate  used
in  either  the  perpetual  inventory  or  capital
rental price  formulas.7
6 Natural gas and electricity  were supplied to the gins by either
of two utilities.  Moreover,  some  gins served  by the  same utility
were  on different  rate  schedules.  These  facts,  the additional  fact
that some  gins use natural gas while  others use  propane,  and the
gin-specific weights attached to the individual energy source prices
all introduce cross-sectional  as  well as intertemporal  variation  in
WE.
7To test  for possible  sensitivity of results  to the choice of  , =
l/Ti, all estimation  was reconducted  using double-declining  bal-
ance  depreciation,  i0  =  2/T,.  These results  were  very  similar  to
those reported  here and yielded identical  conclusions concerning
the hypothesis  tests.
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Dollar  value  of investment  data  obtained
from each  gin  was converted  to the quantity
measure, It, by dividing by real purchase prices
per bale of ginning capacity per hour. Current
purchase  prices,  qt,  for various  capacity  gins
were obtained directly from a leading gin man-
ufacturer  and projected  to earlier  years using
the  relevant producer  price  indexes.  Capital
stock for the base year, 1980, was obtained via
the procedure described by Stevenson (p. 168).
The  capital rental  price,  W,  was obtained
using the Christensen-Jorgenson  (p.  304) for-
mula:
wi, = [1  - u,z, - Vt  + buZ,]
[Qi,_-lr, + qiti - (qit  - qi,.-,)]
- dtq,,  i=  G, B,
where  Ut is the  average  marginal  income tax
rate for the co-op  members,8 Zt is the present
value  for tax purposes of one dollar of depre-
ciable investment,9 Vt  is the  10%  investment
tax credit (ITC), and b, = .5 for 1984,  1985; b,
=  0  for  1981-83  so that  btVtU,Z,  reflects  re-
duction in the depreciable base by half the ITC
in  1984,  1985.  The  qt  are  the  real  purchase
prices for gin capacity discussed previously;  rt
is the cooperatives'  opportunity cost of capital
set equal  to the Sacramento  Bank  for Coop-
eratives average term lending rate for each year;
0, are the real depreciation rates discussed ear-
lier; (qt - qi,,-,)  measures capital gain or loss
on the  asset;  and d,  is the  property  tax  rate,
effectively  1% in California.
Expenditures  for each  capital  asset,  G and
B, were measured as the product of the stock
and the rental rate and then summed to obtain
total capital expenditures. The overall capital
rental  price,  WK,  for each  gin  was  obtained
using an expenditure  weighted  average of the
gin's rental prices for buildings and equipment.
The  output  price  per  bale  for cotton  was
computed as
P, = Pc, + 0,Ps,,
where  Pc is the  price  per  500-pound  bale  of
lint, Ps is the price per ton of cottonseed, and
8 Income  acquired  by cooperatives  is taxable  to the  members.
Since nearly all California  cotton farms are  sole proprietorships,
partnerships,  or  closed  corporations,  we  used  the  annual  mean
marginal  U.S. income tax rate for individual  returns to represent
U. Failure of the IRS to provide farm  tax return data apparently
precludes  doing any better.
9  Nearly all of  the ginning co-ops used straight-line depreciation
for tax purposes with tax lives (T,)  of  12 (25) years for equipment
(buildings).  Hence,  Z,,  = (1/r,T)[l  - (1/(1  + r,)Ti]  (Christensen
and Jorgenson).
4  is the ratio  of tons of seed per  500-pound
bale  of lint.  Specifically,  Pc was  the  annual
price paid to SJV growers for the Valley's pre-
dominant SLM ("Strict Low Middling") grade
of lint by Calcot, Ltd.,  the marketing  cooper-
ative  which  handles  48%  of the  California-
Arizona lint cotton sales; Ps was computed for
each gin as  its annual  net payment per ton of
clean seed from Ranchers Cotton Oil, the fed-
erated  seed  marketing  cooperative  in which
nearly all SJV co-op gins are members.  Cross-
sectional  and  time-series variation  is present
in Ps and  0 due to quality  differences  in the
raw cotton, while Pc varies only intertempor-
ally.
Gross'annual revenues  are the product of P,
and the annual bale production.  Gross  oper-
ating profit is the  gross revenues  less the  ex-
penditures on labor, energy, and capital.  Sam-
ple  means  for  these  financial  variables  were
labor  expenditure,  $412,000;  capital  expen-
diture,  $364,000;  energy  expenditure,
$254,000; lint revenue,  $2,808,000;  and seed
revenue,  $2,180,000.
Estimation
In estimating  the system,  {0,1 } dummy vari-
ables D81-D84 were added to (17) to account
for  possible  year-to-year  shifts  in  the  profit
function  due  to  exogenous  factors  such  as
growing conditions.  The augmented intercept
to (17) is, thus, ao + dD81 + d2D82 + d4D84,
where d1,  d3,  and d4 are parameters. 1 0 Because
the dummy variables are assumed to affect only
the intercept of the profit function, they do not
enter into the share equations.
FIML  parameter  estimates  for  the  unre-
stricted profit function and input share system
are reported in table  1. Most of the estimated
parameters  are statistically  significant and the
model's overall explanatory power is very high
(pseudo R
2 .9999).11
A well-behaved  normalized  profit function
must  be  decreasing  and  convex  in  the nor-
malized input prices. The first property is sat-
10  The  1983 ginning season was deleted from the sample because
PIK-program-inspired  reductions  in cotton  acreage  plus  abnor-
mally  low  yields  on  the  planted  acreage  dramatically  reduced
throughput (more than 50%  in many cases) for the SJV gins.
'' The pseudo R
2(Berndt and Khaled) is calculated as 1 - exp[2(LR
- L,)/T]  where  LR  is the  maximum  value  of the log likelihood
function when the coefficients  on all right-hand side variables are
constrained to be zero, Lt  is the value of  the log likelihood function
for the unrestricted model, and  T is the number of observations.
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Parameter  Coefficient  t-Statistic
aCL  0.0357  5.752
aK  -0.0034  3.085
aE  0.0120  0.984
YLL  -0.0048  4.958
7YKK  0.0009  6.648
EE  -0.0239  12.558
YLK  0.0006  6.208
YLE  -0.0051  3.973
KE  -0.0009  3.361
6R  0.9943  56.834
ORR  -0.0011  0.603
SRL  0.0041  4.693
RK  0.0005  3.829
ORE  0.0071  6.592
D 8,  0.0016  1.645
D82 0.0018  1.701
D84 0.0025  2.103
kL  0.1182  4.837
kK 0.0165  6.208
kE  0.5205  27.775
Constant  0.0148  0.173
Pseudo R2 .9999
isfied if the fitted  expenditure  shares  are pos-
itive,  while  convexity  is  met  if the  Hessian
matrix  of partial  derivatives,  82 ra/OwOw,,  i, j
= L, E,  K,  is  positive  definite.  The  mono-
tonicity property was satisfied for each  obser-
vation in the sample, while convexity was sat-
isfied  at  the  data  means  and  also  for  the
majority  of individual observations.
Turning  to tests of the hypotheses  set forth
earlier,  the individual ki were significantly less
than one in each case. To formally test the joint
hypothesis, H1: kL = kE = kK = 1, the equation
system was  reestimated excluding the ki.  The
resulting  model  is  the  ordinary  normalized
translog profit function  system.
The test statistic for H1 is the likelihood ratio
test,  - 2 (LR  - Lu), where LR(Lu) is the max-
imum value of the log likelihood function  for
the  restricted  (unrestricted)  model.  The  test
statistic is asymptotically distributed as x2with
degrees  of freedom  equal  to  the  number  of
restrictions. H1 imposes three restrictions and,
as  the  calculations  in  table  2  indicate,  was
strongly rejected at the .01  level. However, the
relative  efficiency hypothesis,
Ha: kL= k=  kE,
which  imposes  two  restrictions,  was  not  re-
Table 2.  Tests of Hypothesis
Rela-
tive
Cobb-  Absolute  Price
Douglas  Price  Effi-
Form  Efficiency  ciency
Number of Restrictions  9  3  2
Test Statistic  168.0  212.84  0.14
X
2Critical Value  .01  Level  21.67  11.34  9.21
jected by the  data (table  2).  Also  tested and
rejected was the hypothesis that the behavioral
profit  function,  equation  (15),  was  Cobb-
Douglas, i.e., that coefficients for the nine cross-
product terms in (15)  were all zero.
Thus,  given  rejection  of H1,  we  conclude
that  the  ginning cooperatives  in  our  sample
did not exhibit absolute price efficiency, tend-
ing on average  to overutilize  variable inputs,
including capital (H2), relative to their optimal
levels. Failure to reject H1a indicates, however,
that we  cannot conclude that  the sample  co-
operatives either under- or overutilized capital
relative to the other variable inputs, labor and
energy.  In particular,  because the tests  of rel-
ative efficiency between  specific pairs of ki are
conditional upon rejection of Ha, the hypoth-
eses Hlb and H3 cannot be rejected either.
To interpret these results,  note that the un-
known  cotton  ginning  technology  approxi-
mated  by  the  translog  must  exhibit  nearly
quasi-fixed  proportions in that little substitu-
tion is possible between R and the other inputs,
although  L, E, and K may be somewhat sub-
stitutable among themselves.
Since R is treated as given by the co-op gins,
its  level,  along with  the  prices  for the other
variable  inputs,  enters the marginal-revenue-
product function for any variable input, say L:
MRPL = MRPL(L, WE,  WK  R).
If the technology were exactly quasi-fixed pro-
portions, i.e., if
Y= min{R/h,  h(L, E, K)},
where  / is the fixed conversion factor between
raw cotton and the composite cotton/seed out-
put,  Y, then MRPL must fall discontinuously
to zero  at the  employment  level  where  Y =
R/A.
Although minor substitution between R and
the variable inputs may be possible,  the mar-
ginal revenue  products  for L, E, and K must
decline rapidly near the point where  Y = R/hl
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so  that even  small  absolute  errors  in factor
employment  may  become  manifest  in  very
small values for the k, as were observed in our
analysis.
As  to  capital  usage,  our  results  contradict
the  common  presumption  that cooperatives
will  underutilize  captial,  tending  instead  to
support the Caves and Peterson hypothesis that
capital may be absolutely overutilized.  In this
regard, our sample gins generally met the four
necessary conditions to induce the Caves and
Peterson hypothesis.
A referee has suggested that perishability  of
cotton makes timely ginning important to pre-
serve  quality.  What  would  appear  to be  ex-
cessive  use  of capital  and  other inputs  may,
therefore,  be  a rational  response  to perisha-
bility. This point is undoubtedly valid for many
agricultural  products,  but  perishability  con-
cerns  are  limited  in our  application  because
over  half of SJV  cotton is harvested  in non-
perishable  modules.
Analyzing cooperatives'  behavior along the
NARP and specifically,  Ho in (8),  entails com-
putation and examination of the elasticity,  E,R,
of profit with respect to the cotton input. Two
measures of E,R  are relevant.  The actual elas-
ticity,  e€a,R  is computed from the actual profit
function,  ra, in (17):
aln 7ra
ra'R  91dn  R
+ bR  + fRRln  R
+  2  fRjln(kjw),
j= L,E,K,
where '  is the term in curly brackets in (17).
However, producer behavior is based not on
Tra but on Irb,  the behavioral  function  in  (15)
and the shadow prices,  kw,  where our earlier
results  for the  kj reject the hypothesis that Tra
and -rb are the same function.  Computing the
behavioral  elasticity from (15)  obtains
E,R  = aln lr,/dln R
=  6R  + Kiln R  +  ARln(kjwj),
j  =  L, E,  K.
EraR and ERR were computed for each sample
observation.  The  first  three  rows  of table  3
report the minimum,  mean, and maximum of
these  elasticities.  The fourth  row reports  the
elasticities evaluated at the means of the data.
Examination of the elasticities proves to be
quite illuminating. Previous studies of the gin-
ning  technology  using  economic  engineering
methods (Shaw, Cleveland,  and  Ghetti) have
indicated the presence of pervasive size econ-
omies or, in the terminology of this paper,  an
upward-sloping NARP curve.  Our results con-
firm this finding in that the mean value of the
actual elasticity  ,,R  is nearly 1.10  and is quite
stable across the range of the data.
However, the behavioral elasticities  b,R were
very nearly unitary for each observation,  rang-
ing  from  1.0052  to  1.0139.  Because  the  be-
havioral  elasticities  reflect  actual  decision
making, they are the appropriate elasticities to
examine the unitary elasticity hypothesis, Ho.
However, the Eb,R formula is a nonlinear func-
tion  of the estimated parameters  and  exoge-
nous variables, and its statistical properties are
unknown.
An approximate variance for Eb,R is obtained
by  linearly  approximating  the  elasticity  for-
mula using a first-order Taylor's series expan-
sion and then using the standard variance for-
mula  for  linear  functions.  The  resulting
standard  error,  SE[cb,R]  =  .0042,  is  appro-
priate to test Ho at the point of means only if
Eb,R  is  distributed  normally.  Unfortunately,
there is no basis to justify this assumption  in
the small  sample  case.  Moreover,  simulation
methods  proposed  to  address  the  problem
(Krinsky  and Robb)  do not work  in our ap-
plication. 12 Thus,  although  we are  unable  to
conduct  a formal  test of Ho,  the  qualitative
closeness of the behavioral elasticities to uni-
tary (e.g.,  a doubling of gin size is predicted to
raise profits by less than  101%  at the means)
leads us  to conclude  that the results  are con-
sistent with the game  theory  hypothesis that
multico-op  environments  must be  character-
ized by each  association  operating  very  near
the maximum  behavioral NARP.
In  this  sense  our  results  both  confirm  the
existence  of actual  size economies  in  the in-
dustry  and  explain  producers'  observed  re-
luctance to consolidate gins; economies of size
are not important when evaluated at decision
makers'  kW shadow prices.
13
12  The Krinsky  and Robb  method involves conducting  random
draws of  new parameters from a multivariate normal distribution.
Because our model involves the  logarithms of estimated  param-
eters, the procedure aborts if the algorithm chooses negative values
for those parameters.
1 3  The spatial  costs of transporting cotton from the farm to the
gin also likely  play a role in this regard.
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Concluding  Remarks
This study's objective has been to set forth and
apply an econometric methodology to test key
hypotheses that have emerged from the exten-
sive theoretical literature on the economics of
cooperatives.
Our empirical results have indicated that San
Joaquin  Valley  cotton  ginning  cooperatives
tended to overemploy variable inputs includ-
ing capital relative to the levels obtained from
equating marginal revenue products with input
prices.  These results, thus, lend some support
to the hypothesis that the co-op organizational
form may encourage allocative inefficiency, but
they reject the argument that cooperatives  will
tend to underutilize capital.
Although  actual  economies  of size  appar-
ently  exist  in the ginning  industry,  our  esti-
mates  of the  behavioral  elasticities  of profit
with respect  to cotton input were nearly uni-
tary across observations.  These results  imply
that the  gins  were  all  located  very  near  the
maximum of a flat-topped behavioral  NARP
curve,  a finding consistent with the game the-
ory model of cooperation and with the behav-
ioral implications of  Clark's much earlier work.
Leamer has noted that the strength of infer-
ences  such  as these  hinges upon their invari-
ance  to  changes  in model  specification.  Pratt
and Schlaifer have focused in particular on the
inconsistency of estimates caused by omission
of concommitant  variables (covariates).
We  believe  our results  stand up  quite well
to these critiques.  The profit function  formu-
lation has strong theoretical underpinnings, and
the  translog specification  is designed  to min-
imize  the judgmental  assumptions  that  con-
cern  Leamer.  Theory  also  offers  strong guid-
ance in variable selection for the profit function,
namely input and output prices and quantities
of fixed inputs. Have important variables been
excluded?  Land requirements  for gins are in-
consequential.  Other possible  inputs  such  as
bags and ties for the processed cotton must be
nearly perfectly collinear with the level of raw
cotton.  Where  specific  judgmental  assump-
tions were necessary,  e.g.,  choice of deprecia-
tion formulas, we have attempted to conduct
the sensitivity  analysis requested  by Leamer,
and our results have been unaffected.
A  single  test  of the  hypotheses  examined
here  cannot  be  considered  conclusive  evi-
dence, however, and we hope the methodology
will  stimulate further inquiry into the behav-
ioral  implications  of cooperative  theory.  An
Table 3.  Elasticities of Normalized  Profit with
Respect  to Raw Cotton Input Supply
Profit Function
Behavioral  Actual
Minimum  1.0052  1.0806
Mean  1.0095  1.0968
Maximum  1.0139  1.1172
Data Means  1.00945  1.0964
important  asset of the methodology  is that it
enables  relevant  firm-level  analysis of coop-
eratives  to proceed  without  necessitating  ac-
companying  data for comparable  noncooper-
ative enterprises.  Although such comparisons
are  certainly  useful,  finding  market environ-
ments containing large numbers of both types
of organizations  and  obtaining  the  requisite
disclosure  of proprietary  data  severely  limit
opportunities  to  conduct  such  analyses.  Fi-
nally, because our approach is designed to iso-
late allocative inefficiencies and examine econ-
omies  of size,  it has  prospective  value  as  a
normative tool to promote improved econom-
ic performance  of marketing cooperatives.
[Received March 1988; final revision
received October 1988.]
References
Atkinson,  S. E.,  and R. Halvorsen.  "A Test of Relative
and Absolute Price Efficiency in Regulated Utilities."
Rev.  Econ. and Statist. 62(1980):81-88.
"Parametric Efficiency Tests, Economies of Scale,
and  Input Demand in U.S.  Electric  Power Genera-
tion."  Int. Econ. Rev.  25(1984):647-62.
Babb, E. M.,  and R. D.  Boynton.  "Comparative  Perfor-
mance  of Cooperative  and Private  Cheese  Plants  in
Wisconsin."  N.  Cent. J. Agr. Econ. 3(1981):157-64.
Bemdt, E. R., and M. S. Khaled.  "Parametric Productiv-
ity Measurement  and Choice Among Flexible Func-
tional Forms." J. Polit. Econ. 87(1979):1220-45.
Caves, R.  E.,  and B.  C. Peterson.  "Cooperatives'  Shares
in  Farm Industries:  Organizational  and  Policy Fac-
tors."  Discussion  Paper No.  974,  Harvard Institute
of Economic Research,  March  1983.
Christensen,  L.  R.,  and  D.  W.  Jorgenson.  "The  Mea-
surement  of U.S.  Real  Capital  Input,  1929-1967."
Rev. Income and Wealth,  Series  15(1969):293-320.
Clark,  E.  "Farmers  Cooperatives  and  Economic  Wel-
fare."  J. Farm Econ. 34(1952):35-51.
Fama, E.  "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm."
J. Polit. Econ. 88(1980):288-307.
Guilkey,  D. K.,  C.  A. K.  Lovell,  and R.  C.  Sickles.  "A
Comparison  of the  Performance  of Three  Flexible
Sexton,  Wilson, and WannWestern Journal of  Agricultural Economics
Functional  Forms."  Int.  Econ.  Rev.  24(1983):591-
616.
Helmberger,  P.  "Cooperative  Enterprise as a Structural
Dimension  of Farm  Markets."  J. Farm Econ.
46(1964):603-17.
."Future  Roles for Agricultural Cooperatives."  J.
Farm  Econ. 48(1966):1427-35.
Helmberger,  P.,  and  S. Hoos.  "Cooperative  Enterprise
and Organization  Theory." J. Farm Econ. 44(1962):
275-90.
Krinsky,  I.,  and A.  L.  Robb.  "On  Approximating  the
Statistical Properties  of Elasticities."  Rev. Econ. and
Statist. 68(1986):715-19.
Lau,  L.  J.,  and P. A.  Yotopoulos.  "A Test  for Relative
Efficiency  and  Application  to  Indian  Agriculture."
Amer. Econ. Rev.  61(March  1971):94-109.
Leamer, E. E.  "Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics."
Amer. Econ. Rev.  73(March  1983):31-43.
LeVay,  C.  "Agricultural  Co-operative  Theory:  A  Re-
view." J.  Agr. Econ. 34(1983a):1-44.
"Some  Problems  of Agricultural  Marketing Co-
operatives' Price/Output Determination  in Imperfect
Competition."  Can. J. Agr. Econ. 31(1983b):105-10.
Murray,  G.  "Membership  Strategies for Corporate Con-
trol  in  British Agricultural  Co-operatives-Part  1."
Agr. Admin.  14(1983):51-63.
Oberhofer,  W.,  and  J.  Kmenta.  "A  General Procedure
for  Obtaining  Maximum  Likelihood  Estimates  in
Generalized  Regression  Models."  Econometrica
46(1974):579-90.
Ohm,  H.  "Member  Behavior  and  Optimal  Pricing  in
Marketing  Cooperatives."  J. Farm Econ. 38(1956):
613-21.
Porter, P. K., and G. W. Scully.  "Economic  Efficiency in
Cooperatives." J. Law and  Econ. 30(1987):489-512.
Pratt, J.  W., and R.  Schlaifer.  "On the Nature  and Dis-
covery of Structure."  J.  Amer. Statist. Assoc. 79(1984):
9-21.
Sexton, R.  J.  "Perspectives  on the Development  of the
Economic Theory of Cooperatives."  Can. J.  Agr. Econ.
32(1984):423-36.
"The Formation of Cooperatives: A Game-The-
oretic  Approach  with Implications  for  Cooperative
Finance,  Decision  Making, and  Stability."  Amer.  J.
Agr. Econ. 68(1986):214-25.
Shaw, D. L.,  O. A. Cleveland, Jr., and J. L. Ghetti.  "Eco-
nomic Models  for Cotton  Ginning."  College of Ag-
ricultural  Sciences  Publication No.  T- 1-158,  Texas
Tech. University,  1977.
Staatz, J. M.  "A Theoretical Perspective on the Behavior
of Farmers'  Cooperatives."  Ph.D.  thesis, Dep.  Agr.
Econ.,  Michigan State University,  1984.
. "Recent  Developments  in the  Theory  of Agri-
cultural Cooperation." J. ofAgr. Cooperation  2(1987):
74-95.
Stevenson,  R.  "Measuring  Technological  Bias."  Amer.
Econ. Rev.  70(March  1980):162-73.
Varian,  Hal  R.  Microeconomic Analysis,  2nd  ed.  New
York: W. W. Norton,  1984.
Vitaliano, P.  "Potential Benefits and Costs to Agricultural
Cooperatives  from  Assuring  Access  to  Input  and
Product  Markets." Farmer Cooperatives  for the Fu-
ture, pp. 64-70.  Dep. Agr.  Econ., Purdue University,
1986.
66  July 1989